THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON MEDFORD DIVISION ARNAUD PARIS, Petitioner,) Case No. 1:22-cv-01593-MC v. December 7, 2022, 2:00 PM HEIDI MARIE BROWN, Respondent. COURT TRIAL EXCERPT OF TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE HONORABLE MICHAEL J. MCSHANE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

2 1 **APPEARANCES** 2 FOR THE PETITIONER: DAVID B. STARKS McKinley Irvin PLLC 3 1501 4th Avenue 4 Suite 1750 Seattle, WA 98101 5 6 FOR THE RESPONDENT: KATELYN D. SKINNER 7 Buckley Law PC 5300 Meadows Road Suite 200 8 Lake Oswego, OR 97035-8617 9 10 11 12 13 14 Kendra A. Steppler, RPR, CRR COURT REPORTER: 15 United States District Courthouse 16 District of Oregon 405 E. 8th Avenue, Room 2100 Eugene, OR 97401 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

THE COURT: All right, folks. Thanks for your patience. Let's go back on the record, and we'll hear any closing arguments the parties wish to make, starting with the Petitioner.

MR. STARKS: Thank you, Your Honor. Are we -- did that mean we're set?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. STARKS: Okay. Thank you.

And I would want to start with just pointing out that what's on the ELMO, Your Honor, is what I sort of understand -- understood -- was the theoretical thing that the Court's surely working its way through. Article III is the article about wrongful removal and retention.

The Ninth Circuit in the Mozes case, which is M-O-Z-E-S, has told us here sort of the questions you're going to ask yourself when you're thinking about a wrongful removal as a judicial officer, I mean, as the lawyer, when I'm analyzing my case. So that will be there just if you've got questions or thoughts about any of those particular questions as I go.

And now I'll start. So, as a lawyer, you know, I like logic puzzles. I think many of us do. That's why we go into the law. It's interest of figuring out the spaghetti and how to unwind the noodles. And so, as a result, I have a tendency to see them sometimes where they are really not. And so I find it important for me, in many of my cases, and certainly in this

case, as well, to take that big step back and ask myself whether I've really got a puzzle or not.

And I think how I would do that, in this case, is take that first big step back and ask, "Why do we have the Hague Convention at all?" And, you know, I've answered that case -- I've answered that question how the Ninth Circuit answers it in Mozes. And, you know, every circuit answers it about the same way. But I have always liked the Third Circuit sort of cut-to-the-chase talk about why we have the Convention.

And I'm thinking specifically the Karkkainen case. It's K-A-R-K-K-A-I-N-E-N. It's 445 F.3d 280, Third Circuit, 2006. In the Karkkainen case, the court said, "The Convention was designed to deter parents from engaging in international forum shopping in custody cases." That's what the Convention is for.

I think that's a nice, really, straight to the point, why do we have the Convention, and why are we sitting here today?

Because we all know what happened in this case. This does not become a logic puzzle case when we ask ourselves, through the framework of why we have a Convention, why are we here?

The Respondent specifically, and with intentional forethought, engaged in international forum shopping for the custody case she planned no later than July 19th -- as we can see from Exhibit 23, which was admitted into evidence -- the case she planned to bring in Oregon when the time was right for her to do so under the UCCJEA. That was the plan. And if the

Convention is to stop that, then she's violated the Convention.

There's a wrongful removal of the children as a result.

So the Court asked about wrongful removal, but I do -- and I'll talk about that. But I do want to say that let's remember there's actually two prongs to analyze, not just one. A wrongful removal of children occurs when a parent takes children to another country without authorization of the other parent before leaving.

A wrongful retention is when a parent does not return with those children to the country of habitual residence after some agreed period of time. And we have both of those things to think about in this case, Your Honor, not just wrongful removal.

So, as I prefaced my remarks with, it's important, I think, to understand that Exhibit 23 demonstrates a wrongful removal. If Mr. Paris did not intend to follow the July agreement, all that means is he had intended for the children's habitual residence to remain in France. He intended a status quo decision when it came to the July agreement, if you were to believe that he never had any interest in following it.

That's not a custody forum shopping decision. That's a status quo decision. The girls remain in their habitual residence. They remain in their schools. They remain with their friends and family with whom they've grown attached over the three years that they've been in France.

And these are, of course -- you know, they're very young. I mean, from their perspective, I imagine, other than this short period of time they've been in Oregon, they really only remember France. This was during, you know, ages four, five, six, and seven. Right? I mean, this is a very formative time for children. These are little French kids.

So we don't have a forum shopping issue going on if we are just to believe that Mr. Paris was never interested in following the agreement.

I would also say that I think it's a little tough on him to say that I don't think that he ever planned to follow the agreement. You know, we heard his testimony, and we all understand that he's ill. And the way I think of those few weeks that he remained behind in Paris in early August, is that the force majeure of this situation for him became apparent to him. He needed to be in France for medical care.

It was during that window between July 29, when his family had left for Oregon, and August 19, when he joins his family in Oregon -- it's during that period of time that he's talking with his dad and having his dad raise alarm about this plan that he's been cooking up to somehow have insurance in Oregon and have it all work out.

It's during this time that he gets the Exhibit 25 that confirms he has insurance that will last for no less than five years to try to deal with the illness that he has.

It's during that time -- that August 19 -- or, I'm sorry -- that July 29 to August 19 that he gets the notice of Exhibit 26 that if he were to live outside France, that could jeopardize his insurance.

And the idea at trial -- I mean, I'm an American citizen -- the idea at trial is not to bash the U.S. medical system, but to point out the obvious. Mr. Paris is at no risk of going broke in France with the medical care that he needs. He's not going to have -- he's going to have the full attention of whatever medical team he needs and whatever medical services he needs. There's not going to be an insurance company that decides that for him, and it's not going to be the power of his pocketbook that decides that for him.

He's not going to be bankrupt at the end of his illness in France. And nobody here can promise that to Mr. Paris in Oregon. We simply can't. We know how ObamaCare's been beat around. Forget Regence Blue Shield and all the rest. You know, the preexisting -- we all know the preexisting conditions, which were -- tried to be attacked shortly after the legislation was entered.

There are no guarantees in the United States about what sort of medical care he's really going to have in Oregon. And so I think it's pretty tough to -- I think it can be a little tough -- to just sort of paint the same brush for both why he might have -- between August -- between July 29 and

August 19 -- gotten some significant cold feet about this July agreement, and what was going on, on the other side, which, on July 19, had already planned, by January 2022-2023, to be filing for custody in Oregon.

And these are two very -- the spirit between those two differences of, "I don't want to follow the agreement," and "I don't want to follow the agreement," are very, very different. And only one of them violates the Convention. Only one of them is international forum shopping by a family for purposes of a custody decision. And that's not what Mr. Paris was doing.

And I'd also point out, you know, one of the things that I didn't talk about in Exhibit 83. And Exhibit 83 is that WhatsApp where Mr. Paris is talking about the fact that, "Hey, I found this on your computer. Your explanation is making no sense. Was this your lawyer or was this you? If it was really just your lawyer and not how you felt, you would have fired her right away to say these evil things about me. And the fact that you're just waiting for me -- you're even going to use the fact that I'm sick and in France against me, as being an absent father, when you filed for custody in January."

Part of that -- he also says -- and I'll use the clean language. He says, at one point, "It's my effing life." And you know what he means by that. Right? What he means by that is, "You're telling me you would lie to me just to have a custody case in Oregon instead of France and maybe kill me?"

Right? "You would really do that?"

And so you can understand really the place he found himself in as we're getting ourselves ramped up to these children leaving and him figuring out really what's going on with his health and what needs to happen next.

I still think that it's important also to understand that the medical condition remains a big issue in this case. He still has that medical condition. And a couple of things are important. Both how I've described it, which I think anybody who gets bad medical news is going to need some time to process that. And, you know, he hadn't processed it on July 19 like he processed it by August 20. Right? He simply had not. And I don't think that that's wrong. I don't think we need to be upset with him for taking some time to figure that out.

I would also point out that during the time that he sorting this out as we run up to the July 19 agreement, you do have to consider the psychological manipulation that he was going through. You've seen the videos in Exhibits 47 and 48. And they were devastating to him. Right?

THE COURT: I agree. But, I mean, up until the 13th, the whole family was leaving for Ashland, and all of a sudden he's gone with the passports, puts a hold on a tickets, and everything that seemed to be in place disappears, and Ms. Brown is in a hotel room with two kids.

MR. STARKS: I'm not sure that's exactly the case,

Your Honor. I understand what the Court is telling me. Here's my -- here's what I believe I heard and what I think was going on.

I think these parties were having problems back in April and May and were in therapy. And I think that they were discussing, in therapy, all kinds of things and hoping it was going to get better. And I think one person thought, "I want to move to Ashland, Oregon," and the other person thought, "I want to try to keep my family together."

And so we have all this sort of marching along with one person, perhaps somewhat naively, saying, "I want to keep my family together," while another person would like to move to Ashland.

Then you have the fact that in May and into June,
Mr. Paris learns that he's ill. And it becomes clearer and
clearer that he's ill enough that the idea of moving to Oregon
is becoming more and more an idea that's -- I know we don't
talk about this in the federal court for purposes of your
decisions -- but for how he's thinking about things, it's
becoming more and more not in the best interest of the
children. I mean, that's why he goes out and gets that
pediatrician's note that he does. Right? It's because he -you know, he senses and he knows that the kids need to be
around him.

And I would also point out -- let's see if I can find it

in my notes here quickly. Otherwise, I'll come back to it. You know, there's an email that the Respondent sends to Mr. Paris, while he's in France in that July 29 to August 19 period, where she's talking about the difficulties that the children are having, and thinking about how sick he might be, and how he's not there.

So all these things are going on. And I certainly understand the Court's -- what the Court was saying to me when -- "Hey, I mean, yeah, those videos are pretty terrible. But nobody looks exactly great on July 13, Mr. Starks," is what I'm hearing you say. I don't disagree.

But you have to remember, I mean, who the pressure is on.

Right? I mean, the pressure isn't on Ms. Brown. Ms. Brown
doesn't have any physical maladies. Ms. Brown has a job in

France. We can find another apartment. If these parties were
in a better state in their relationship, we wouldn't be here.

Right? Because all it would have taken is them having a really
good conversation about how, "Look, I'm -- this is really tough
for me. This is not going to work. You just leaving, us not
having any sort of agreement in place, me trying to have
mediations with you" -- right?

You've got these two exhibits where Mr. Paris is saying,
"Hey, I mean, I'm not okay with this. We need to talk about -I feel like you're leaving. We need to talk about the fact
that if you're leaving, and you're really not coming back, and

this isn't going to be a family anymore, I want a mediation to try to figure out what our international parenting plan's going to look like." Right?

So I don't think that -- I think it was well done testimony. I don't think it was exactly what was going on. I think Ms. Brown was very well aware that Mr. Paris had real, real concerns about this move. And she was just hoping she could -- it would get pulled off, and whatever the problems would be would get sorted out in Oregon. That's how I feel about it, Your Honor.

So there's the wrongful removal. Right? We've got
Exhibit 23. We know what that means. We also have Exhibit 49
and 50. These are the petition for the divorce and the
custody. These are the letter with the proposed temporary
order and the proposed parenting plan. And that's -- we have
the fruit of the Exhibit 23 plan. Right? It's no longer just,
"This is what I might do when I get to Oregon," as Ms. Brown
testified. It is, "Here's what I've done."

Now, she's hone -- she's filed sooner than she wanted to.

Right? She wanted to wait until January to know that she got
six months in Oregon. She went ahead and rolled the dice, did
it with three months, and argued not home state but significant
connections. Right? But you have the fruit of the decision
on -- that's set forth in Exhibit 23 of what she was going to
do. So we have the removal. We see it from Exhibit 23. We

see the fruit of that removal from Exhibits 49 and 50.

And let's just be clear -- right -- there would have never been nine suitcases, there would have never been a lifted travel ban, these children would have never been in Oregon on July 29th for even a summer vacation if the Respondent had not lied, pretended she wished to remain a couple to entice Mr. Paris to follow the children and her to Oregon.

If she hadn't done -- if truly she had not done what she did, which was enter into a July agreement she never intended to follow, we would not be here, these children would be in France, and these parties, if they couldn't make it work as a couple, would have a French custody order about how to handle their French children.

I also do want to talk about the agreement in a practical way. And, again, I don't want to suggest the Court is here to think about the best interest of the children. But I'm a divorce lawyer, so I can't help but talk about this stuff a little bit.

This was a family law agreement. Right? In a family law agreement, if facts change such that an agreement between the parties becomes detrimental to the children, no court enforces that agreement. Right? As a practical matter, if the Court were to determine that an agreement between parties had now turned into something that would be detrimental for the children, that agreement's gone. And I believe that that's the

case.

And I'm not suggesting Mr. Paris is a lawyer or a Court is allowed to make those decisions, necessarily. But, as a practical matter, what we have is a parent who's ill, who needs to have medical care in Paris, and his kids should be there. His kids should be around while he's going through this medical care.

And this is where it was going to take me some time to find it. The exhibit that I was talking about was Exhibit 27. That's the email from the Respondent where she's describing to him the issues that the children are having with his absence in that July 29 to August 19 time frame. So, as a practical matter, they shouldn't have a dead dad and they shouldn't have an absent dad. Both of those things are not in their best interest.

So, to me, as a practical matter, the agreement has always been kind of a bigger thing than it ever needed to be over this case. Because, again, if these parties had been working well, that's not -- you would both walk away from that agreement.

"Oh, my God, you mean you're so ill that you've gotten this five years of care in France now. Oh, my gosh, the kids are communicating to me how scared they are about this." I mean, there would be no conversation. Everybody would be back in France. Right?

So, as a practical matter, it's just not in the best

interest of the children in that agreement. It's just not.

And so I don't think that it ever really needed to be followed.

I just don't. Especially when we know, ultimately, what

happened with Mr. Paris' need for medical care. So wrongful

retention, because I think that there is that in this case as

well.

So, again, not to make it sound like we don't all understand. But wrongful removal -- you shouldn't have taken them. Wrongful retention -- you should have brought them back, and you didn't. Right? I mean -- and both of those are wrongful under Article III, and both of those things are things that you can circle and say, "As a result, wrongful; you've got to send these kids back to France."

So I believe you have a couple of dates to choose from in thinking about wrongful retention. You've got August 20. On August 20, the Respondent convinces Mr. Paris to turn over the children's French passports to her. Then she refuses, as she testified on cross-examination, his multiple requests to return those passports, leading him, as the Court knows, to file police reports that are found in Exhibits 32 and 33 regarding the state of affairs at the family home in Oregon.

If you -- and I know -- I'll get to (indiscernible) at the end. You said it didn't matter too much.

THE COURT REPORTER: Sorry. "I'll get to" what?

MR. STARKS: I'll get to habitual residence at the

end. I'm trying to watch here. So I -- I'll get to habitual residence at the end, because I know I should talk a little bit about it. But, I'm with you, I don't know how France couldn't be the habitual residence.

If France is the children's habitual residence, Mr. Paris could not have wrongfully removed the children from Oregon with their passports. The only thing that could happen is that, without the passports, the Respondent could be sure that she could accomplish a wrongful retention. That's the only thing that could be accomplished by her maintaining the passports.

If France is their habitual residence, his removal of the children back to France would not have been in violation of the Hague Convention. She could have filed something in French family court alleging that they had this July 19 agreement, and he was breaching it, and the children should be brought back. But it's not a Hague Convention case. France is the children's habitual residence.

All it is, when you take those passports, is a wrongful retention. That's all you're doing. You're making sure the children, who are habitual residents in another country, cannot be taken back to that country. It's not a logic puzzle.

Right? It is. I'm describing gravity. It is what it is. So that's the first date.

I would also have you keep in mind that Mr. Paris never got those passports back. Right? Those passports now sit --

because you entered an order saying that all passports needed to be turned over to the Medford clerk. Those passports -- those French passports sit in the Clerk's Office in the federal court building in Medford, Oregon. And so those passports have been wrongfully retained as long as the children have been wrongfully retained in this state.

The second date would be October 7. And I've described Exhibits 49 and 50, which are the petition for divorce, and the letter, and the temporary order, and the parenting plan, and all that sort of stuff. I've described those as sort of the fruit of the wrongful removal. Right? How do we know it was a wrongful removal? Well, we've got Exhibit 23 and then we've got the filing of a divorce.

But I would also point out that under Roche v. Hartz -which is R-O-C-H-E -- Hartz, H-A-R-T-Z -- which is a district
court case out of Ohio. It's 783 F. Supp. 2d 995. It's a 2011
case. Under that case, the court was looking for dates to
figure out, okay, when did the wrongful retention start. And,
in that case, the court said the retention started the date
that the petition for divorce was filed. Because, at that
point, you had notice that the parent was never coming back
with those kids to the habitual residence that you were
asserting had been their habitual residence.

THE COURT: Help me out. I'm looking for the exhibit. What day was the petition filed?

MR. STARKS: October 7, Your Honor. The exhibit is Exhibit 49.

THE COURT: In your earlier argument that wrongful retention is the date of withholding of the passports, that date would be...

MR. STARKS: Oh, I'm sorry. That date would be August 20. That would be the date that he turned over the passport, and all requests after that date were denied by the Respondent for their return.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. STARKS: So those are the two dates. You've got those two dates, I believe, to circle as potential wrongful retention dates. But, again, I don't think wrong -- I certainly understand all the evidence this Court has had to take and all the things this Court has to think about. But, for me, it's just really not a big logic puzzle for removal.

These children would not be here if there had been no July agreement. That July agreement was fraudulently entered into by the Respondent with no intent of ever following it. That was a wrongful removal.

Now, what we would pivot to -- right -- if I've established that we've got a wrongful removal, you'd pivot to the defenses that the Respondent has raised. And she's raised two Article 12 defenses. I guess, here I would point out -- I think the Court knows, but just to point out -- my burden as

the Petitioner was on the wrongful retention part -- right -- to establish habitual residence.

If I've done that -- if you decide I've made a prima facie case with the testimony I was able to put on and the great argument I'm giving you now -- if you were to decide that, the burden then shifts to them on any defenses they wish to raise. And because -- and they raise two Article 12 defenses, consent and acquiescence. In other words, that Mr. Paris has either consented to the children being here or acquiesced to their presence to be here. Right?

And that now is their burden. It's not my burden to say, "No, we didn't." It's their burden, again, by preponderance of the evidence, to convince you that more probably than not he has consented or acquiesced.

I would also point out a couple of things when you're thinking about these defenses. The concept of these defenses is that they are narrowly drawn to effectuate the purposes of the Hague Convention. And, you know, just about every case that talks about this talks about it. But I will tell -- you know, I'm looking, again, at a Third Circuit case. It's Tsia-Yi Yang, T-S-I-A-Y-A; Yang, Y-A-N-G. That's Third Circuit. It's 499 F.3d 259, a 2007 case.

You know, the idea is that these are narrowly drawn, because the purposes of the Hague Convention are what? To send children home; right? So we're not supposed to get overly

legalistic and technical. We're not supposed to be looking for reasons to find these defenses. They're to be narrowly drawn and you're to be convinced. Right? And so -- and I would also point out that even where a defense applies, you, nonetheless, have the discretion to return the children anyway.

And that's both that case and many other cases -- and Hague Convention Article 18. Hague Convention Article 18 says, "The provisions of this chapter do not limit the power of a judicial or administrative authority to order the return of the children at any time." So you have this sort of catch-all in the Convention. Maybe some things were interesting. Maybe they raised a defense that you thought was a good defense.

If you still think the children's home is France, and they should go to France, then you still have the authority to do so. These are to be narrowly drawn. And even if you find that the defense is well taken, you have the discretion to order their return anyway.

So here's the things I would have you -- the Court -- I would ask the Court to try to keep in mind when thinking about consent and acquiescence. First, I think consent is out the door. Just like Exhibit 23 shows that there was a wrongful removal, Exhibit 23 shows there was no consent to the removal. Right? The consent that was obtained was fraudulently obtained with a lie and would not have been obtained -- the consent to remove the children to Oregon would not have been obtained in

the absence of that lie.

So then the question becomes acquiescence. And I have a specific case in my materials that I provided to you in my trial brief. It was a district court case out of Texas. It's page 7 of the trial brief if the Court ever wants to take a look at that particular case. And, in it, that father did some of the things that this father has done who's before you.

Mr. Paris never consented to the children's enrollment in school in Oregon, just like the father in the trial brief case never consented to the children's enrollment in Texas. And that was one of the ways the Court found there had been no consent or acquiescence. He hadn't agreed to it. He hadn't agreed for the children to be there to attend school there.

You have not only that he affirmatively wasn't involved in the enrollment process of the children, but you also have Exhibit 51, which is his email with the principal -- or with the school personnel of some kind -- letting them know that he did not consent to the children attending school in Oregon. That's Exhibit 51.

And Exhibit 52 -- you have his email where he's attempting to confirm whether the Respondent has ever let the principal know that the children were just going to be there for a year.

And the principal says, "That's never been communicated to me. No."

So you have a clear chain from him of, "I'm not agreeing

to this." Right? "Here's my email to the school. Here's my email to the principal. I wasn't involved in enrolling the children in school." And of course he did not sign the house lease. So he did not consent to there being a house for the children to be living in, in Oregon. And I think that's a big deal and wasn't -- and maybe hasn't been talked a lot -- talked enough about. He did not agree to sign a lease for these children to be in Oregon for a year.

And so he didn't agree that they could attend school, and he didn't agree they could live there in any document that was put in front of him that would make him agree.

Now, there are things that happened. Right? If I was opposing counsel, I'd argue about the fact that he was in California, loaded up a truck, and brought it across state lines with all the stuff. I'd also try to argue the nine suitcases, but I'd remind you that the nine suitcases don't exist without Exhibit 23.

But I'd try to argue all the stuff he did when he got to Oregon. Right? I'd argue about, you know, what about the nice WhatsApp messages where he says, "Let's be a family," and all the rest of this? And, you know, I know what Mr. Paris testified to -- that he felt he was -- that was the only way to see his children. You know, there's -- other than his testimony -- there's certainly no WhatsApps that say, "You can't see the kids."

I will say, there are messages, though. Right? You've got messages where, you know, he's being treated like a child. Right? He's being told, "Oh, well, you know, maybe you can start staying with the parents again when you apologize for your behavior. This can be a good teaching moment for the children to see you treated as a child having to apologize before you can stay someplace."

This was not -- here's what I would tell Your Honor. I think this is very clear, regardless of whose testimony -- or whether either one of them had testimony you wholly believed at any time -- there was a true power imbalance here. Right? There's one person who's, you know, born and raised in France. And their motivation, whether they're accomplishing it with the greatest deal of aplomb every time, is to try to keep their family together.

So it's not crazy to imagine a world where, when you have this differential in power, and you have someone who's really trying to keep a family together, and who is ill, and who wants to be able to see their children, and is really doing their best to try to figure out a way to stay on the person who's got the power in the relationship right now -- stay on their good side -- and talk them into coming back to France as a family. Right?

It's easy to imagine taking steps that a clever attorney might call, "Hey, you were just acquiescing to this removal or

this retention." But the facts would suggest -- are really the product of what it's like to be in a messy relationship. You know, many of us -- thankfully, most of us haven't in been in a situation that was so messy they needed to be in front of a federal court judge.

But we've all been in messy relationships where, at every moment, we weren't necessarily at our best, and where, every moment, we might have taken steps that we thought were the best way to keep the peace. And if someone was to ask us later, in a deposition or a trial, whether that meant we agreed or acquiesced, we'd have to say, "Wait, wait, wait. That's not what I meant or what I was trying to do."

So that would be what I would really try to drive home with the idea of acquiescence, Your Honor. This is a true power differential. He doesn't have the children's passports. They are being kept from him. He sees the children when she lets him see the children. Right? I mean, he's not on the lease of the house. He's not going to come and go.

He testified that the keys to the car -- he didn't -- he wasn't given the keys to the car. So he came and went as people pleased, not necessarily how he pleased, in trying to keep the peace in that situation, in trying all along to figure out a way to say, "Hey, can we just get back to France?" You know, that makes, to me, at least 51 percent sense as a way of thinking about whether there's truly acquiescence in this case

or not.

So, in result, you said you didn't want or need a lot of habitual residence argument. I agree. I mean, I don't know how these children couldn't have been habitual residents of France at the time of their removal. These are children who --we have one child who, the testimony is unrebutted, was signed up for a four-year program. So not only does that show that she was habituated before -- that she had been there for three years -- but that another three years was anticipated that the family would be there just for the musical program that she was engaged in.

And this family was looking for apartments. And that was Exhibit 75, Your Honor, that you were thinking about earlier today in your questions for Ms. Brown. Exhibit 75 is the text messages and WhatsApp messages of the French apartments that the parties had looked at. I think some of them -- some of those are as early as February, and some of them are as late as in between that July 19 and August 20 window. Right? So -- or July 29th -- so July 29-August 19 window, when the children have left on July 29 with Ms. Brown, but Mr. Paris remains in France. That exhibit also shows him sending her apartments for France during that window. Right?

So I think it's, to me, very clear that these parties and the children were habitual residents of France. And so, you know, what's that mean? And, as I said, Your Honor, I think

Holder says it best when it says, you know, "Are you sending the children home if you send them back to France?" Because your job is to send them home.

And the logic puzzles can be interesting. You know, as a lawyer, as I said, you know, I have a weakness for them. You know, if the restaurant serves mushroom soup on Wednesday and lentil soup on Thursday and all that good sort of stuff. But, at the end of the day, you know, most Hague Convention cases can get boiled down to some pretty specific issues that carry the day. And I feel very strongly that the specific issues that I've identified for you in this argument really carry the day.

These children need to be sent back home to their friends, to the home that they've lived in, to the schools that they've attended. These are French children, and they should be returned. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

For Respondent?

MS. SKINNER: Thank you, Your Honor.

The Convention and the enforcing U.S. law -- the ICARA -- indicate that the international abduction or wrongful retention of children is harmful to their well-being. And I agree with Mr. Starks' contention that this is not, although, a best-interest case. And the Court must determine whether or not a wrongful removal or retention takes place.

So the first step is determining whether or not a wrongful removal occurred. The Court heard credible testimony from Ms. Brown about the months and days leading up to the children's removal from France. The Court heard testimony that the parties had discussed over the years, since their move to France in 2019 until their ultimate departure in 2022, that that was an ongoing discussion about the parties.

I think there's some pretty clear evidence that the parties left California in 2019 with an intention to be in France for a limited duration while they were developing their California property. And that that got delayed mostly because of COVID and because of the pandemic that was going on. When the discussion finally came back on the table again, after the 40th birthday that Ms. Brown celebrated, tickets were purchased. Those were one-way tickets from France to the U.S., and it was specifically scheduled for a date that would work for the children's schooling and their activities for July 13th.

So the parties, at that time, agreed to have the return move to Oregon. At that point, Mr. Paris took the lead on -- what was important to him in the move was to have an au pair on the ground in Oregon to ensure that the girls were maintaining their connection with France while in Oregon. And so on May 19th of 2022, the parties signed the au pair application. They then interviewed the au pair, both by video and in person. She

was going to start in August of 2022, and the contract notes a 12-month commitment.

The parties continue on their steps towards their move to Oregon by sending a letter and email to their French landlord indicating that they were going to move to the U.S. and settle in. The parties unenrolled the girls from both of their schools for the upcoming school year, while reserving their daughter's space in the musical program. That was to be put on pause for a year.

And not only did Ms. Brown involve herself with the removal of the children from the French school system, but Mr. Paris was an equal participant in that. And we can see that in Exhibits 211 and 213, where Mr. Paris is asking for not only a copy of the radiation certificate -- the unenrollment forms -- but he's also asking for a certificate showing that his daughter had, in fact, passed that grade and could move on to the next grade.

The parties sold their furniture from their big apartment and took multiple steps. They gathered numerous suitcases from different sources, from the grandparents, from others. They bought luggage. They worked out the schedule again for when they would move. And Ms. Brown took multiple steps in order to ensure that she'd have a job when she got to the U.S.

She interviewed with multiple companies, and while she was interviewing, Mr. Paris would watch the kids. And, ultimately,

she decided that the best employment move for her was to see if her France employer could transfer her to their U.S.-based position, which is exactly what happened. So that all fell into line.

They said "goodbye" to their family and friends. They purged items from their larger apartment, because it would not fit in the small 200-to-300 square foot apartment that they stayed at for a brief period of time. And they forwarded their mail to Mr. Paris' father so that the refund from their large Paris apartment could be mailed to him and not be lost. And so when they did go back to France to visit, their mail would be kept for them.

Mr. Paris was an equal and willing participant in all of those steps until the unfortunate date of July 13th, when he blocked the parties' removal from France. Thereafter, an agreement was put in place that allowed the parties to reengage with that agreement. And July 29th was chosen as the date that everybody would -- well, at least Ms. Brown and the girls -- would go to Oregon, and Mr. Paris would follow thereafter.

And so --

THE COURT: But you would agree, I mean, he's allowed to change his mind about the permanent removal from the United States --

 ${\tt MS.}$ SKINNER: I will get there, Your Honor.

THE COURT: -- or to the United States.

MS. SKINNER: And I have a couple of cases that I would like to point out to you at that time. I appreciate that question, Your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. SKINNER: And so the next question is whether there was a wrongful retention. And that deals, again, with whether or not the children remaining in Oregon thereafter was at any point wrongful.

And I'd like to point out, for that specific question, an answer. And that's in the form of a couple of appellate court cases that I've printed off, and I'd like for the Court to take very careful consideration of. Because they do answer for us this question of what happens when someone retracts or rescinds their agreement? Where does that leave us? And so if I may approach with a copy of a couple of cases. And I'll hand the same two to Mr. Starks.

THE COURT: So do these cases deal with retracting while in the habitual residence, or once you get to the new country?

MS. SKINNER: Both, Your Honor. And so I'll start off with describing the situation in Gonzalez and Caballero (sic). In that case, the petitioner, a U.S.-based parent, allowed the respondent, who was a Panama-based parent who had the -- who was the primary parent -- who had the child at the time, to take the child to the U.S., but promptly after the

child left, claimed that the visit was to be for no more than two weeks, and then contacted law enforcement.

The Ninth Circuit held that her revocation of prior consent was too late. The court found that the petitioner's claim that she only authorized a temporary removal was inconsistent with the facts, and determined that the respondent's testimony was more credible and consistent.

Now, she contends that the -- the petitioner contends that the post-departure conduct shows that she rescinded or revoked her consent to the removal and retention; however, the district court found that post-departure -- excuse me -- that once the district court found that there was the prior consent given -- they called it "ex ante consent" -- the court's inquiry was complete. Because if someone shows ex post nonacquiescence -- so dispute after the fact -- that could not revive your return remedy under the Convention.

The second case that I wanted to point out for the Court also follows along, very similarly, with the facts of this case -- Cascio v. Pace. And, in that case, the petitioner argues that his agreement for the children to go to the other jurisdiction was given under duress, and that his subsequent conduct shows that he never actually consented to the retention.

In that case, the court had some troubles with the credibility of that witness. And the court ultimately found

that the consent exception applies when a petitioning parent either expressly or through his conduct agrees to removal or retention before it takes place. Again, in that case, the petitioner argued that, well, he was under duress when he did so. And the court ultimately found that the petitioner's post-retention behavior was consistent with an individual who had changed his mind after consenting and then rushed to correct what he thereafter had decided to be an error.

The court finds, in short then, that the petitioner expressly consented to the retention before it occurred, and that his later change of heart is irrelevant, as the Hague Convention does not provide a mechanism for the revocation of consent once given.

And the reasoning behind that is pretty clear. It's because we don't want to have the kids going back and forth, just like in this case, where the children's residence in France was abandoned. They do not have a home to go to in France.

If they were to be returned today, they'd go to a 200-square-foot apartment where they'd be sleeping on a pull-out couch. And that's not the result that this Court should reach. And so I'd ask the Court to take careful consideration of both Cascio and Caballero.

And, importantly, in the Cascio case, where the court has some concerns about the credibility of the petitioning parent

and his claim that he was under duress, I'd like the Court to look at the petitioner in this case.

Now, there is numerous documents into evidence that, when compared with petitioner's statements, cast doubt on his credibility. For example, Exhibit 248, the email he wrote to the Topanga neighbors in 2019 about going to France for the school year. He says, for a very kind of confusing explanation up on the stand, about, "No, I didn't really mean that."

THE COURT: Right.

MS. SKINNER: "That was something that Ms. Brown" -- so -- so he said that was a lie that he said.

And then, when we look at Exhibit 206, the au pair application, petitioner claims, very confusingly, either he didn't know or he didn't read or he didn't believe that, in fact, the au pair was a year-long commitment.

And then we look to 207 and 214, the email to the French landlord indicating that they're moving back to the U.S.

Again, that's a lie, although I can't -- I couldn't quite pinpoint as to why that would be a lie and why that would be something that Respondent would be pressuring him to say.

Number 60 -- Exhibit 67, correspondence where Petitioner tells Respondent he's made peace with his decision to stay in Ashland. He's team Heidi. Again, that was a lie, he says. It was just to appease Ms. Brown. He says he was pressured. But, in fact, the evidence shows that it's Mr. Paris who puts

pressure on people. His own testimony -- he used that phrase -- he put pressure on his ex-wife.

We saw in evidence, in Exhibit 255, he put pressure on Ms. Brown's MatchTune employer, threatening them if they didn't testify in his favor, they were going to have problems with their reputation.

And then, finally, we heard he put pressure on Ms. Brown when he demanded the children's beds just this last Sunday, not so that he could use them while he was here with them in Oregon, but so that he could put them in storage and so that she couldn't use them, because he purchased them. Otherwise, he was going to call the police on her. So, in fact, it's Mr. Paris who's putting pressure on other individuals.

And, again, the -- Exhibit 227 and the email from the children's French school director indicating that she had prepared the unenrollment forms -- that was done by both parents' request. She provided the documents. But, again, Mr. Paris is claiming that's not really how it happened, or that's a lie.

Further, Exhibit 253, an email from the director of Est's school, again, describing the situation where the child had --was -- she used the word "expelled" -- but we know she was unenrolled from school. And the director had discussed that with both parents. But, again, Mr. Paris says not true or that's not really what happened.

And so I think the Court needs to review the evidence that's been admitted and test that against the testimony of the Petitioner to determine -- to make a credibility determination.

Now, we talked about wrongful removal and wrongful retention. There's also the issue of whether or not, when that occurred, what was the habitual residence of the children. Of course, the Court looks to the totality of the circumstances. And the most important question is when are we placing a date on determining where their habitual residence was?

If the date was today or the date was four months ago, that's going to be a decision for the Court to make if a wrongful removal or retention took place. We need to determine when and what the children's habitual residence was at that point.

Now, the Monasky decision, of course, indicates that -- that's the -- we look at the totality of the circumstances.

Well, here there was clearly --

THE COURT: Slow down just a little bit for the court reporter.

MS. SKINNER: Thank you.

Here there was clearly a move to Oregon, gave up the France apartment, sold all furniture in France, brought up items from storage in California to Oregon, enrolled kids in school in Oregon, secured a year-long Oregon au pair.

So what is habitual residence? Do the children have

habitual residence in France after they had departed and said,
"Au revoir, we're leaving that behind for the year"?

THE COURT: Can we start with wrongful removal?

Because I'm still not hearing you talk about --

MS. SKINNER: The -- our argument --

THE COURT: -- the underlying agreement by which the children left for the United States. And, I agree, there are some credibility issues with some of the explanations that don't make a lot of sense by Mr. Paris. But, I'll be honest, I'm not sure if the explanation that your client gave about Exhibit 23 is particularly credible.

I know she kept saying, "It's made out of context," but I've yet to see what other context there is, especially in light of the fact that, on October 7th, she filed a petition totally revoking any interest in the July 19th agreement.

MS. SKINNER: Thank you, Your Honor. And I'll address both points.

As to the intent of Ms. Brown at the time she entered into the July agreement, I think she testified credibly that she negotiated that agreement for hours and hours. There was discussions back and fork about health insurance and all of the conditions that were placed. She had already started to do the work to put those things --

THE COURT: Right.

MS. SKINNER: -- in motion.

And if she had had a plan to not follow through with the July agreement, then why would she get her French visa renewed in September of 2022, or take the steps to get it renewed?

THE COURT: But what she told me is that she wanted to leave her options open, which tells me that she believed she had the unilateral ability to simply keep the children in the United States. And she certainly has -- is attempting to do that by the October 7th filing.

MS. SKINNER: And I'll address the October 7th filing in just a moment. With the testimony about keeping options open, I think we need to look at that in light of the flip-flopping that Mr. Paris had done at that point. And I think her credible testimony was -- in discussions with her lawyer -- it was, "What do I do if he reneges on this again? What can I do? What -- could a plan be put into place if that happens? I need something with security."

And what we don't have in evidence is any evidence that shows that she took -- and I'll get to the October 7th custody pleading in just a moment -- so that aside -- she took no steps to renege on the July agreement. And, in fact, the opposite is true. She took all of the steps to keep that agreement upheld and in place.

There's no evidence to show that there was an appointment scheduled with an Oregon lawyer for July 29th, plus six months, so that she could go in there and get the petition filed.

There was no petition for custody that was drafted up and ready to go, so that on six months and a day, that that could be done. Because she didn't take any steps to breach the agreement.

Now, why did she file Exhibit 49, the custody case in Oregon? Not because that was part of her preplan, because, in fact, the six months hadn't expired at that point. She did that because dad had filed in France, on October 3rd, a French custody case. And Ms. Brown was concerned that, again, it was another reneging of a contract, and that Mr. Paris was going to use the October 3rd French custody filing to, again, yank the kids back.

And so the October 7th, 2022, filing had nothing to do with, "I'm trying to now get UCCJEA jurisdiction." It had everything to do with simply getting a status quo in place so that the terms of the July agreement would be able to continue in force. Because, with the status quo, the kids are here for the time being, in line with that one-year agreement.

Now, Mr. Paris' counsel had much to say about Mr. Paris' illness. But I haven't heard any testimony or receive -- I didn't receive one piece of evidence brought into this court about a single condition, symptom, or any impact that it had on Mr. Paris' daily living, except that he takes some B-12 vitamins and goes and sees a doctor occasionally.

But, more importantly, the information about his disease

was known to him at the time of the July agreement, which was why all of those conditions were built into the July agreement, which was why Ms. Brown went to all of the lengths that she did to ensure that Mr. Paris' medical condition would be adequately met in the U.S.

Mr. Paris indicates in his closing argument, again, that this is not a best-interest determination in the court today. We know that the state court level will determine what's in the kids' best interest. He brought up a reference to Exhibit 27, wherein Ms. Brown was indicating to Mr. Paris that the kids were concerned for their dad. They were afraid he was going to die. And that's because that's what he told them. He was manipulating them and said, "Your dad is going to die."

And so he's bringing his kids into the case. And we have evidence of that from just earlier this morning where Mr. Paris is messaging with Ms. Brown, just recently, saying, you know, "Basically, I'm telling the kids that we're moving to Paris at the end of this court case, so you better get your act in gear." And so we have evidence that he's been bringing the kids into these inappropriate communications.

Now, Mr. Paris argues, and his counsel argues in closing argument, that he didn't consent to enrollment in Oregon school. But he sure consented to unenrollment in French school well before even the July agreement. That was something that they then remained unenrolled in the French system until much,

much later, when he attempted to reenroll the children there.

Now, he's indicating that he is not, quote, "on the lease to the Oregon property." But he's an authorized resident of that lease. He has the rights to -- and that's how that was set up.

He also agreed to put one of their children's four-year musical program on hold for a year. That was done. And so steps were taken to ensure that the parties' move, for one year, was put into motion. And the one-year pause on the program, of course, was also agreed to by Ms. Brown. She didn't say that the children need to be removed from school altogether and taken out of that program. She went along and agreed, equally, with the proposal that the children's schooling in France would be put on hold, and that that program would be reserved for them.

Now, there's one other case that I'd like to bring to the Court's attention if this Court finds that the facts fit this situation. And that's the idea of whether or not Mr. Paris is bringing this action prematurely, having to do with the question about anticipatory breach. And that is the Toren v. Toren case, cited also in my briefing, 191 F.3d 23 --

THE COURT: Right.

MS. SKINNER: -- which talks about a father who was petitioning to a claim that the mother had made an intent to retain the children past their agreement. But that date had

not been reached yet. And the court held there that father's argument was based on mother's future intent, and that the father was seeking a judicial remedy for an anticipatory violation of the Hague Convention. But the Hague Convention only provides a cause of action to petitioners who can establish actual retention. And so that was merely anticipatory retention.

We've got the same facts here if the Court finds that

Ms. -- even if the Court does find that Ms. Brown has made an
anticipatory retention, which we argue she hasn't. No steps
were taken. The October 7th Oregon custody petition was for a
separate reason, again, to protect and preserve the July
agreement to keep the children here.

And so this -- and then I also want to touch, just briefly, on habitual residence. Because I think that -- depending on if the Court finds there was a wrongful removal or retention, that does not begin and end our discussion about habitual residency being in France. Because if the Court finds, for example, that there was a wrongful removal or retention, and if the Court sets the date of October 7th, for example, I think there's still a pretty strong argument that on October 7th, the facts under a Monasky analysis show that Oregon was, in fact, the children's habitual residence at that time. Because France had been abandoned. And the evidence shows that the children pretty quickly assimilated into their

surroundings here in Oregon.

And so, in closing, Your Honor, we argue that there was no wrongful removal or retention. If there was, we argue the defense of consent. And if the Court finds that the defense of consent is satisfied, that's the end of the discussion.

There's no more habitual residence argument. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

Reply?

MR. STARKS: Just briefly. Thank you, Your Honor.

In looking at the two cases, I gave them as steady an eye as I could in a short period of time. I had -- I will say on Caballero, the court says at the end, at page 795, "We cannot say that its factual finding of consent was clearly erroneous," which is not exactly screaming from the mountaintops that the only decision could have been that there is a finding of consent.

And in the Cascio -- I'm maybe pronouncing that right -maybe not -- C-A-S-C-I-O -- in the Cascio case, which is the
Northern District of Illinois trial court case -- or, yeah,
the -- it merely makes a note at, well, page 866, I believe,
that the court was finding, in short, that he had expressly
consented to the retention before it occurred.

And I would really go back to Exhibit 23 and say that I don't believe the Court can make that same finding here. This

consent was based on a lie. And it's simply not the case that it was the sort of consent I think any court is looking for. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

All right. Let's take a quick break and give me a chance to get my thoughts together.

MS. SKINNER: Your Honor, I apologize if this is tardy. I had prepared, as a demonstrative aid for my closing, our proposed timeline.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. SKINNER: And I'd like to present that to Your Honor. And I've got a copy.

MR. STARKS: Thank you.

And I apologize, Your Honor. She had actually sent me a nice proposed timeline with mine and hers. And I -- it was this morning. And I've been so full of this case, I didn't check my emails until we were waiting for you on the bench. So if you do need something, let me know, and we can still provide that to you.

THE COURT: Okay.

All right. We'll be in recess for 15 minutes.

MR. STARKS: Thank you, Your Honor.

(A break was taken from 3:04 PM to 3:26 PM.)

THE COURT: Okay. We'll go back on the record.

All right. So, as a preliminary matter, both Ms. Brown and Mr. Paris, my decision today is not about who's the better parent, who has behaved badly. I think both Mr. Paris and Ms. Brown -- you're good parents. You obviously love your two girls.

And I think, for the most part, you've shielded them from their parents' conflicts -- not all of them. I think both of you understand the importance of having each of you in the lives of your children -- and also the grandparents. I really did appreciate the fact that there was obviously joy in Mr. Paris' father having some time with -- in Ashland -- with the granddaughters. And that tells me you care enough that you're not going to hold your children hostage. So I just thought I'd throw that out.

It's also apparent there's no shortage of hurt between the two of you. It's not surprising to see both sides capable of some manipulation, some crimination, some snooping, some dishonesty. It would be hard to find a breakup of a real relationship that didn't encompass some of that stuff. I mean, I see it in every relationship that I know of that is meaningful that falls apart. But I do sincerely hope both of you can move past a lot of those issues and focus on the children.

So in terms of habitual residence, I'm finding that

Mr. Paris is a dual citizen in both France and the United States. He has a residence in France and at various times has been a resident of the United States. Ms. Brown is a United States citizen. The twins were born on January 15th, 2015, in Ashland, Oregon. They stayed there for a very short, short period before moving to Topanga, California.

In 2017, at the age of two, while living in California, the twins became French citizens. Between 2017 and 2019, the family visited France, I believe, three times, for a total of about ten months. During that time, they did attend a French preschool. And they would have been age two to four during these visits.

In August 2019, the family moved to Paris. I mean, there's some dispute as to whether the move was intended to be temporary. I think it was. I think, at the very least, at the time of the move, the parties intended to have the children attend preschool in France for at least a year. They told family and friends they intended to be gone for a year.

They had plans to develop property in California. They kept their household goods and stored them in California. They rented a furnished apartment in Paris rather than purchasing a home or furnishings. But, all that said, is it happens with the best of intentions. The family remained in France well over a year. Certainly, I think the pandemic may have contributed to this, as well as other factors.

The girls were obviously doing well in school and enjoyed it there. There seemed no pressing reason to return to the United States after one year. So one year turned into three years, and during those three years, Paris became the girls' home, meaning it was their habitual residence. The children were French citizens. They spoke fluent French. They attended French schools that had, you know, year-long programs at these academies for music and dance.

The girls were involved in sports. They went on school and family excursions, regularly, throughout France. They had school-age friends and attended certainly visits with friends and birthday parties, those type of things. They had extended family and social support in France, including a godfather.

So I'm finding the children were fully assimilated to France and an intensive fact inquiry points to the only conclusion that when the children left France for Oregon in July this year, France was their habitual residence. And that analysis is under Monasky v. Taglieri, which stands for the proposition that the intent of the parties, while important, is not so much as important as, you know, where was the children's home at the time of removal.

So the much more difficult issue, in this case, is whether the removal of the children to Oregon was wrongful or whether there was a wrongful retention. The question here is whether Ms. Brown -- whether Ms. Brown unilaterally decided to remove

the children to the United States without the consent of Mr. Paris.

So here the Court finds that in early 2022, it is apparent that Ms. Brown is no longer happy living in France. I wouldn't say she was having a mid-life crisis, but, by her own testimony, she had turned 40. She hadn't intended on staying in Paris as long as they had. She certainly did not have a job that she seemed very passionate about. She wanted to be closer to her family. And the relationship with Mr. Paris was -- it's hard for me to know what it was at times, to be honest, but it was less than perfect. There were definitely some difficulties in the relationship. And it's clear that Ms. Brown wanted to go back home.

Also, early in 2022, Ms. Brown did convince Mr. Paris that the family should return to the United States, specifically, that they return to Ashland, Oregon, where she has family. I'm a little unclear whether they have property there or not. But I don't know if that's -- that means much to me right now.

And this is where, you know, really the difficulties start to play in. Because, Mr. Paris, your intent and what you want seem to change dramatically. It seemed like everybody was on board in early 2022 that the family was going to move to the United States. One-way tickets are purchased April 25th, 2022, for a flight to depart on July 13th, 2022. I believe everybody was leaving on that flight.

Everything the family did up until the July 13th departure appears to be in anticipation of a permanent move to the United States. The girls are unenrolled from the French schools by the parents. The lease to the apartment is broken, and the landlord was told, "We are moving to the United States."

And, again, these are one of the explanations, Mr. Paris, that you give, that you didn't really mean that. You've said that about a number of explanations you've given to various people. And, at some point, it starts ringing a little hollow. I think you broke the lease specifically because everything points to the fact you were, in fact, moving to the United States. All of the girls' belongings were packed -- everything, for the most part -- and any unnecessary items were disposed of.

On July 13th, however, Mr. Paris leaves his family and files paperwork -- I'm not sure exactly the specifics of all of this type of paperwork and whether it was with the police department or some other authority -- that effectively puts a hold on Ms. Brown's ability to leave France with the children. Mr. Paris is holding the passports of the entire family at this time.

Ms. Brown is left with the two girls, no passports, no home to go to. She moves the children into a hotel, and they're living out of their bags. Mr. Paris has apparently changed his mind about moving to Oregon. But he's also put

Ms. Brown in a remarkably difficult position.

It's a little unclear to me whether Ms. Brown was keeping the children from Mr. Paris at this time. It's clear that the children and Ms. Brown are upset about not being able to go to Oregon. I think, even on -- in the limited aspect -- that a number of events, that I can only think were positive and uplifting to the children, such as summer camps, that they would have begun immediately, were now out of the question. Visiting the grandparents seemed out of the question.

I do think Ms. Brown's attempt at impacting Mr. Paris through a very emotional video was -- she described "a bad parenting moment." But it was a bad parenting moment. And it was a bad parenting moment primarily because of the actions of Mr. Paris at this time.

Now, I realize people get to change their mind in the middle of all this, and Mr. Paris certainly had a right to change his mind. But it does then put into play this rushed attempt to put together a remarkably unusual agreement, the July 19th agreement, which allows the girls to fly to the United States for the summer vacation period. It allows the girls to remain in the United States for the 2022-2023 school year, as long as certain conditions are met.

And, you know, those conditions generally are that, by a certain date, there be a -- I think by August 22nd -- there be a lease to a four-bedroom home that also includes a home

office, that there will be an au pair that will be contracted with for the school year, that there will be health insurance purchased for Mr. Paris by August 22nd in the United States. If he's not eligible, I think, for the Oregon Health Plan, the agreement is Ms. Brown and Mr. Paris would purchase that insurance. And there's some requirement that there be a doctor's appointment I believe with a gastroenterologist.

The agreement was negotiated in France with a mediator and filed in a French -- I'm assuming a French court -- I'm not quite sure how France works -- on July 19th, 2022. Ms. Brown and the children fly to Oregon on July 29th, 2022. At some point, Mr. Paris joins them.

And, again, this is where we get into behavior that's hard to understand exactly what Mr. Paris' intentions are. During this period, he joins the family. He lives, at times, in, it appears to be the family home. He assists the family in getting set up in the Ashland home. He appears to consent to the family being in Ashland in various texts. He denies that he meant what he said in those texts.

He collects the household belongings in California and brings them up to Ashland. He assists in bringing on the au pair. He assists in unenrolling the girls from the French school. He certainly assisted in getting out of the lease in France. On the other hand, he refuses consent to the lease of the home in Ashland, although he agrees he's listed as an

occupant. And he did not sign any enrollment documents of the children in the Oregon school.

So based on this activity, it's very difficult to understand what Mr. Paris wants or where he wants the family to be. He is also having to deal with a medical condition that might legitimately raise concerns as to whether living in France is in his better interest.

I will say, I agree with the Respondent in this area; that it is unclear to the Court the seriousness of the condition.

The record is silent with regard to any medical opinion. I've heard some testimony about having to take B-12. I've heard some testimony that there may -- this particular disease may have aspects of cancer. But I certainly have not seen anything more than Mr. Paris' description of his medical condition.

During this time, Ms. Brown is holding the children's passports to prevent Mr. Paris from returning to France with the kids, because, I think, in her own words, she was unable to assess, from day to day, what he was going to do.

Ms. Brown does complete all of the conditions required by the July 19th agreement to keep the children in Oregon for the school year. Mr. Paris refused to accept the insurance policy, that was purchased on his behalf, by revoking it on August 21st, allegedly due to his medical situation. Again, I'm not sure if I'm willing to find this completely credible, because, one, there is no medical record before me; two,

Mr. Paris' explanation for his responses in other parts of the trial have been less than credible.

On September 3rd, Mr. Paris does search Ms. Brown's computer and finds emails between attorneys indicating that Ms. Brown's strategy is to not return the children to France for the 2023-2024 school year. That obviously has caused him a lot of concern -- and the Court as well.

But here's what I think as to the July 19th agreement: I think both sides entered the July 19th agreement with some doubts to how committed they were to it, in part, because it is completely unclear as to whether the relationship between Mr. Paris and Ms. Brown could maintain itself. I don't think either side knew whether they could make it work as a couple or as a family unit, and, in part, because Mr. Paris has created an untenable situation in which the children had no home, no passports, and no future options for where they would be staying.

Mr. Paris believed he needed to do very little to effectuate the insurance requirements of the agreement. This does seem incredible to me, because, given his medical issues that needed to be addressed, I would have thought he would have been more proactive about finding medical care and finding insurance in the United States -- or working out a way to address his medical needs in France. He ultimately would not accept the insurance purchased, despite that condition being

met almost unilaterally by Ms. Brown.

I agree that Ms. Brown seems to have wanted to leave her options open. Both sides seem to think that it is possible to unilaterally change their mind under the French agreement, which, for better or worse, they both bound themselves to.

So I'm finding that there has been no wrongful removal. I base this, in part, in the language found in Flores Castro v.

Hernandez Renteria, 971 F.3d 882, a Ninth Circuit case from 2020. Judge Smith holds that removal is not wrongful if there's consent to leave the country. It only becomes wrongful when children are retained without consent.

I don't believe consent, in this case, can be so easily revoked, and that it results in the children then being treated like a ping-pong ball. At this point, the agreement and the activities of the parties suggest that Mr. Paris has consented to the family living in Oregon for the 2022-2023 school year.

Obviously, if Ms. Brown chooses to keep the children in Oregon, she will be in violation of the French agreement. The Oregon courts may want to, and I think they should, enforce the agreement you entered into. I think you should be stuck with it, even if you change your mind.

There may be other reasons why the Oregon courts would find otherwise. I do believe that if that comes -- if it comes to that, there's clear evidence before the Court today that the children are certainly creating a habitual residence in the

United States without any great impediment.

So I am going to deny the petition. I am going to find that there has been no wrongful removal. This was a difficult case. I apologize to both of you for how difficult it is, to both sets of family. I don't see anybody as a great winner here when both of you worked very hard for these children and for both of you.

Is there anything further we need to discuss?

MR. STARKS: Thank you for your time and attention, Your Honor.

MS. SKINNER: Nothing from Respondent. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, both.

(The proceedings adjourned at 3:45 PM.)

CERTIFICATE

Arnaud Paris v. Heidi Marie Brown

1:22-cv-01593-MC

Court Trial Excerpt

December 7, 2022

I certify, by signing below, that the foregoing is a true and correct transcript of the record, taken by stenographic means, of the proceedings in the above-entitled cause. A transcript without an original signature, conformed signature, or digitally signed signature is not certified.

/s/Kendra A. Steppler, RPR, CRR Official Court Reporter

Signature Date: 12/13/2022